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Abstract
This paper explores the process of manufacturing capital and labour productivity
convergence across the regions of Greece. The starting point of the analysis is the
evolution of current thinking about productivity in spatial analysis. It is suggested that
the greater mobility of the factors of production within national borders is to a large
extent responsible for the long-standing tendency of geographers to overlook regional
productivity dynamics. Some definitional issues in the measurement of productivity
precede the estimation of regional capital and labour productivity levels in Greece
during the period 1984-1994. Some surprising results are generated. There are clear
signs of convergence, but it is the main metropolitan area of the country that attempts
to match the labour productivity levels of the other regions, while the latter strive to
achieve the capital productivity levels of the capital. The examination of spatial
variation in capital intensity makes clear that convergence trends are mainly the
outcome of an adjustment process in response to economic crisis. A closer look at the
regional incentive legislation reveals an unexpected culprit behind the trends.
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1. Introduction
Given that spatially uneven industrial growth is a prime topic in economic geography,
it is surprising that changing regional productivity is a relatively understudied area.
Geographers seem to be more interested in the dynamics of the unequal distribution of
the factors of production (labour and capital) rather than in the regional inequalities of
their productive use. However, there are clear signs that this has started to change. In
the field of regional science, at least, there is a proliferation of studies focused on
productivity growth and the factors that affect it in a variety of regional contexts.
Apart from the numerous US studies (a detailed review is offered by Gerking, 1994),
mention can be made of the studies of Chen (1996) in Chinese regions, and Vagionis
and Spence (1994) and Vagionis and Sfakianakis (1997) for Greece. At the same time
productivity concerns are being raised more frequently in mainstream geographical
thinking.
There are at least two reasons that make necessary a closer examination of the
evolution of regional disparities in productivity levels and growth rates. The first is
because in the long run the improvement of living standards in an economy of any
scale is heavily dependent upon labour productivity increases. From this viewpoint,2
the dynamism of the regional industrial expansion process is reflected, to a large
extent, in productivity growth rates. The second is because recent findings in the field
of international economics suggest that a productivity convergence process between
advanced and lagging economies is under way (Baumol, 1986; Dollar and Wolff,
1988; Doyle and O’ Leary, 1997; Wolff, 1991; Wolff, 1996). To the extent that
similar trends and sources of convergence (structural change, technological diffusion
etc.) are reported to hold at the regional level in many countries (see for example De
la Fuente, 1997 for  Spain), then it is necessary for more attention be paid to this issue.
A more detailed examination of the nature and mechanisms of this phenomenon will
enhance understanding of spatially uneven growth and the factors that oppose it, while
also facilitate the development of policies and strategies for the reduction of such
inequalities.
This paper explores the process of manufacturing productivity convergence in the
regions of Greece. The first issue to be addressed is methodological and concerns the
evolution of the conceptions of productivity growth in geographical thinking. Without
trying to justify the neglect of this important parameter of uneven growth, it is argued
here that the greater mobility of the factors of production within the boundaries of the
national state is largely responsible. The analysis proceeds with a brief discussion of
some of the issues that are involved in measuring productivity.
The main objective of the paper is reached in the fourth section. Here an attempt is
made to estimate and understand the evolution of regional manufacturing productivity
in Greece between 1984-1994. The short period for which there are available data and
their aggregated character make the use of elaborate econometric models problematic.
However, the comparative analysis of two single factor productivity indices - for
capital and labour - clearly shows that a significant and somewhat peculiar
convergence process is taking place in Greek regions over the whole period. The core
region of the capital city attempts to match the labour productivity levels of the
peripheral regions, while the latter, in turn, attempt to close the gap between their
capital productivity levels and those of the principal metropolitan region.
An effort to explain the trends is attempted in the penultimate section. The evolution
of the capital-labour ratio during the period reveals that there is also a homogenisation
process ongoing amongst Greek regions. This trend is mainly the outcome of
considerable regional variation in the rates of employment and capital stock
growth/decline. A closer look at the regional incentive laws offers a rather unexpected
explanation about, perhaps, the major motive force behind regional productivity
convergence in Greece. The paper concludes with a summary of the basic findings and
their relevance to policy formulation.
2. Spatial uneven industrial growth and productivity
The importance of productivity growth for a given economy of any scale (national or
regional) is epitomised neatly in the words of Krugman (1994a: 14). “Productivity
isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything.” If it is properly
understood that improvements in levels of well being are highly dependent upon
increases in labour productivity, then this seems to be far from an overstatement.3
In general, there are two ways through which economic growth can be achieved. The
first is through the expansion of the factors of production and other production inputs.
Increases in the size of the labour force and that of capital stock usually translate into
output growth. In the same vein, improvements in the levels of educational attainment
of the workforce and their skills or in the quality of capital deployed have similar
positive effects. The second way via which economic growth takes place is through
rises in productivity, or in other words increases in the amount of output that is
produced by given amounts of inputs. Such productivity increases can take place as a
result of improvements in the efficiency that the factors of production and other inputs
are used. Technical progress is a major cause of such improvements, but not the only
one. Other factors, such as economies of scale, external economies or agglomeration
economies have been reported to have similar effects on productivity.
Although expansion of production inputs plays a critical role in the generation of
economic growth, nevertheless, empirically it has been observed that the latter cannot
happen without an increase in productivity levels. This, at least, is confirmed by
empirical regularities such as Fabricant’s law, which points to a positive relationship
between output and labour productivity. Similar positive relationships have been
found to hold for output and total factor productivity (TFP) growth (Oulton and O’
Mahony, 1994).
There are several reasons why increases in the volume of the factors of production are,
alone, not enough to sustain high rates of output expansion (Krugman, 1997). The first
is that the expansion of the factors of production is subject to certain limitations.
These can be highlighted once it is assumed that the factors of production are to a
large extent immobile (an assumption that is not so unlikely at the international level).
Employment, for example, cannot be expanded endlessly, because in the long run its
growth rates follow those of total population. Similarly, new capital formation is
heavily dependent on the share of output that is re-invested. The second reason is
related to the increase of the magnitude of economic activity. In the early stages of
economic development, a modest expansion of production inputs will tend to generate
high growth rates. However, enlargement of an economy entails that higher increases
in the amount of inputs (fixed capital, human capital etc.) are necessary for growth
rates to be sustainable. The final issue is that of diminishing returns. It is not certain
that the expansion of the factors of production will lead to equal increases in the
amount of output produced. It is quite possible for the output growth rate, after a
certain point (under a given technological regime), to be less than the pace of the
expansion of inputs.
If the above considerations are transferred into a spatial context then it is apparent that
uneven industrial growth can also be thought of as the outcome of two processes - the
result of unequal expansion of the factors of production and the result of differential
productivity growth. Given what has already been suggested about the nature of input-
driven growth, the spatial divergence in productivity levels acquires clear importance
for the understanding of the evolution of regional inequalities. It must be the case that
regional disparities in output growth are not viable in the long run if they are the mere
outcome of an unequal expansion of the factors of production. Unless, they are
followed by productivity increases, then it is certain that sooner or later they will be
eliminated. Similarly, a process of regional convergence in productivity levels will4
lead to the reduction of regional inequalities in the long run. Thus, it is obviously
beneficial both from an analytical and policy perspective to explore this process. Such
an examination will enhance understanding about uneven growth and the factors that
determine it, and may well lead to the formulation of alternative strategies for the
reduction of regional disparities. Undoubtedly, strategies which focus on enhancing
productivity in the lagging regions, rather than on simple transfers of resources to
them as usually the case until recently, offer the greatest potential.
However, apart from the regional policy aspect, it is perhaps instructive to examine
why some researchers have been, until recently, reluctant to address the productivity
issue. A cursory glance at the late seventies’ industrial restructuring literature reveals
that productivity growth is usually approached as an inevitable process (Massey and
Meegan, 1979). The focus is not on the sources behind differential regional
productivity performance but on its implications for employment growth. This
tendency becomes clearer in the mid-eighties’ de-industrialisation literature where
productivity is viewed as a constraint that under certain circumstances (slow output
growth) will lead to employment decline and higher unemployment (Rhodes, 1986).
During early nineties conceptions of productivity growth began to change. Markusen
et al (1991), for example, employing a more advanced shift-share analysis model than
that of Massey and Meegan (1979) this time for US regions, are also concerned about
the negative impact of productivity growth on employment. Again it is stated that the
positive effects of output expansion are eliminated due to productivity rises. However,
they do also acknowledge that, if regional productivity gains outpace those in other
areas, then they might be beneficial for employment through increases in regional
market share. In more recent papers, the role of differential regional productivity
performance is further explored, not only in the context of uneven growth, but also as
a parameter of regional variation. Spatial differences in productivity levels alongside
differences in the employed share of the population have been argued to be important
explanatory variables of regional disparities in the levels of GDP per head in the EU
(Dunford, 1993; 1996). In addition, regional differences in capital and labour
productivity are now considered to reflect spatial variation in production techniques
(Rigby and Essletzbichler, 1997).
The above brief review is indicative of two issues. First, it points to the tendency of
researchers to approach industrial growth as the pure outcome of the expansion of the
factors of production. The focus, mainly on employment, can be partly accounted for
by data availability. Second, is the view that productivity growth is an inevitable event
rather than the outcome of the dynamism of the industrial development process and,
thus, a target to be achieved. It is tempting to try to account for the neglect of the
productivity dimension using the above axes.
It can be argued that, although growth is dependent upon productivity gains at the
same time, it is also dependent upon the expansion of the factors of production.
According to this explanation researchers have been simply more interested in the
unequal expansion of the production inputs rather than in regional disparities in their
productive use. This argument can be supported empirically. Hulten and Schwab
(1984), for example, report that the faster growth of Sun Belt in comparison to that of
the Snow Belt between 1951-1978 was not due to differences in levels of economic
efficiency, but largely due to differences in the growth of labour and capital inputs.5
It is not difficult to see that the above argument is rather weak since the expansion of
the production inputs is subject to certain limitations. The freedom of the factors of
production to move without any control across regions offers a second, perhaps more
persuasive, explanation. International labour migration is subject to rigorous control
policies, while the same applies, though to a lesser degree, to capital movements in
many countries. In contrast, at the regional level mobility barriers are much lower, and
it can be argued that in many instances researchers have been witnesses to significant
expansionary or declining trends in the availability of factors of production
(urbanisation, centralisation etc.). In such a context, productivity growth becomes
somewhat less important for the sustainability of high rates of growth. The expansion
of production inputs is not dependent any longer on the actual limitations of the
regional economy but on its ability to attract resources. It is pertinent that regional
development policies, since the early days, have focused on the facilitation of the
transfer of production resources from the core to peripheral regions.
Spatial concentration of production resources is also associated with productivity
increases. Agglomeration, external or scale economies are the simple manifestation of
this fact. Until the emergence of diseconomies, the gathering of large amounts of
factors of production leads inter-alia to productivity rise. Given that spatial
concentrations are usually self-reinforced over time (history and accident matter) it
can be argued that regional analysts were more interested in the spatial concentration
process itself rather than its productivity-based, underlying causes. Indeed, for quite
some time they lacked formal methodological tools to model such phenomena. As
Krugman (1991) argues, increasing returns, external economies and imperfect
competition were exactly those aspects that economists found hard to model, at least
until recently. It is worth noting that much of the early regional science literature on
productivity focuses on issues such as agglomeration economies or urban productivity
(see Beeson, 1987 and Gerking, 1994 for a review). The difficulties encountered in
attempts to incorporate into a spatial context conventional production functions that
assumed constant returns to scale are indicative of this point.
The above discussion should not be read as a justification for the neglect of this
important parameter of uneven growth, but rather as an attempt to account for the lack
of interest in it. The difficulty in formulating plausible explanations for this neglect
and the recent revival of the interest indicate that productivity is an important element
of spatially uneven growth. The reasons that have been mentioned so far about the
wider significance of productivity also hold at the regional level. From another point
of view, it can be argued that in the current context of slow industrial growth in many
western economies, its regional importance increases even further. Regional
development policies cannot be based upon the mobilisation of huge volumes of
production inputs as in the past (Mezzogiorno, for example), since in an era of decline
such amounts are simply not available and a large number of regions inevitably bid for
them.
In the succeeding sections an attempt will be made to estimate and understand the
evolution of regional manufacturing in Greece between 1984-1994. But first a brief
discussion about some of the issues involved in measuring productivity, and the
availability of data, is necessary.6
3. Measuring productivity growth
Productivity is conventionally defined as the quantity of output per unit of input.
Consequently, productivity growth takes place as a result of increases in the amount of
output produced by a given amount of inputs. However, as in many other major
economic notions, things are not quite so simple as they seem, either theoretically or
empirically. The fact that many types of output are produced and numerous inputs are
utilised makes the situation complex. Even for the simplest case of one firm using one
input to produce only one homogeneous output, there are at least six different ways in
which productivity growth may be viewed (Diewert, 1992). Space does not permit a
proper exploration of productivity measurement issues, so instead the analysis will
focus on some general empirical points related to the indicators used here.
Additionally, some focus will be placed on the data available to this research.
Although many types of inputs are used in the production process, it is the case that
productivity is usually measured in terms of labour. In general, there are two ways in
which labour productivity is measured: either in terms of output per employee or in
terms of output per hour worked. Such accounting is surely legitimate since welfare
depends in the long run on increases in the amount of output that human beings
produce. However, given that many other inputs are utilised, it is possible that labour
productivity increases may not reflect improvements in technical efficiency, but
merely the pure expansion of other production inputs (Krugman, 1994c, O’ Mahony,
1994). Given the obvious limitations in the expansion of the factors of production, it
is essential to know where the real efficiency gains are.
A neat method to account for those productivity increases that can be attributed to
technical change is total factor productivity (TFP). This growth-accounting method
measures both that part of output increase that is due to the expansion of production
inputs and that part due to technical change. Although TFP has been used extensively
empirically, its foundation in production theory is particularly rigorous, which really
means that almost every single assumption matters in the interpretation of the results.
Thus, strictly, to generate reliable results, estimations have to be undertaken at the
industry-level (three or four digit SIC category), gross measures of output have to be
used instead of value-added, while disaggregated information is necessary on
production inputs in order to account for the variation in their quality (Oulton and O’
Mahony, 1994). Unfortunately, such detailed estimations are rarely possible at the
regional level due to data limitations. The impact of such data deficiencies can be
dramatic. The use, for example, of value-added instead of gross output data, results in
an overestimation of technical progress by a factor of 2 or 2.5. This happens because
value-added usually accounts for approximately 40-50% of gross output (Oulton and
O’ Mahony, 1994). The use of gross output data at the regional level is especially
problematic. Purchased services are not treated as intermediate inputs, while, more
important, statistics do not net-out the manufactured goods produced in one region
and used in another region as intermediate inputs (Hulten and Schwab, 1984). In the
Greek regional context, estimation difficulties are made worse because of the short
period for which data are available.7
The above observations should not be read as a criticism to the considerable
econometric work on the field. However, they do highlight the fact that results should
be treated with caution and always in relation to the hypotheses from which they
derive. For this research at this time, it was decided to use simpler single factor
productivity indices to provide an alternative, and relatively problem free, way of
approaching regional productivity performance. It will be demonstrated that these
simple indicators reveal rather an interesting story that might well provide a helpful
context for more complex analysis.
Capital and labour productivity are the two single factor indices used here. It has been
already mentioned that labour productivity is usually measured as output per
employee or output per person hour. Given that data on hours worked are unavailable
for Greek manufacturing, only the first estimation is feasible. However, this measure
too is not unproblematic. Apart from not accounting for the actual hours worked
(especially important where part-time working is significant), it also does not provide
any information about the quality of human capital. Better-educated or more skilful
employees are also more productive, and thus it is really necessary to account for
regional differences in the quality of human capital. The last problem can be
addressed by the development of an alternative labour productivity indicator, that of
output per unit of labour cost (includes here both labour remuneration and employers’
national insurance contributions). Since better-educated employees are usually higher
paid, interregional differences in labour productivity levels, defined as output per unit
of labour cost, will be unaffected by the spatial variation in the quality of human
capital. Nevertheless, it is useful to compare the evolution of trends of the different
indicators of labour productivity, since some telling aspects can be revealed about the
uneven growth of human capital in the regions of Greece. In both measures of labour
productivity, value-added is used as a measure of output. Given what has been said
about the gross output and intermediate  inputs data, this choice offers the safest
alternative. Following a similar logic, capital productivity is also measured as the
amount of value-added per unit of capital cost. Manufacturing capital stock data are
used as a measure of capital cost. The parallel examination of capital and labour
productivity defined, as value-added per unit of capital or labour cost respectively,
will minimise the risk of attributing production input (intermediate inputs, capital
stock, number of employees, human capital) expansion to productivity gain.
The value-added and labour cost data, necessary for the productivity estimations,
derive from industrial surveys carried out annually since 1974 by the National
Statistical Service of Greece (ESYE). Changes in the regional boundaries and the
unavailability of the 1978-1979 data (the results were never published) mean that only
data since 1980 are operational. This fact reduces considerably the time period of the
analysis since the last year for which data (unpublished) are available is 1994. At the
regional scale, the surveys contain information only for manufacturing firms that
employing more than twenty. The published data are aggregated and refer only to total
manufacturing activity. To estimate labour cost, unpublished data on employers’
national insurance contributions were also used. The transformation of figures from
current prices into constant 1980 prices was undertaken using manufacturing GDP
deflators. The necessary regional manufacturing capital stock data come from earlier
work (Melachroinos and Spence, 1997a). The figures have been estimated under the
assumptions of a double-declining balance depreciation pattern and an 18-year full8
depreciation period. The fact that capital stock data cover only the years 1984-1994
entails that analysis has to be limited even further within this time boundary.
4. Manufacturing productivity convergence in the Greek regions
It will be demonstrated that the exploration of capital and labour productivity reveals
some telling aspects about the evolution of regional disparities in Greece between
1984 to1994. But first it is useful to examine briefly the changes in the traditional
indicators of regional economic performance. This will provide a clear picture of the
unequal distribution of manufacturing among Greek regions, which will be helpful in
putting the productivity figures into perspective.
Regional inequalities in the general distribution of manufacturing activity are clearly
depicted in table 1. They refer to absolute values at constant 1980 prices and provide
an understanding of the actual magnitude of manufacturing activity in each region. In
1994 the region hosting the main metropolitan area of the country (Attiki) accounted
for approximately 45% of all value-added, more than 35% of total capital stock and
44% of national employment. The regions of Central Makedonia and Central Greece
followed with much smaller shares, while there were six regions (Western
Makedonia, Ipiros, Ionian Islands, Northern Aegean Islands, Southern Aegean Islands
and Kriti), where not only the relative shares, but also the actual size of manufacturing
activity were small indeed. The last mentioned group of regions are exclusively
peripheral, located at the borders of the country. Thus, a clear distinction between core
and periphery emerges. Additionally, simple comparison of the 1984 and 1994 figures
reveals that few changes took place in this unequal distribution of manufacturing.
TABLE 1 HERE
Regional manufacturing dynamics are better depicted in table 2, which contains the
annual rates of growth and decline in key performance indicators. Nationally, value-
added remains almost stagnant in a ten-year period (growing by less than 0.4% per
year), while capital stock and employment decline at an alarming pace (2% and 3%
respectively). Another interesting aspect is that labour costs also decrease, but at a
much slower rate (0.75%) than employment. The term ‘de-industrialisation’
encapsulates the principal economic theme of the period.
TABLE 2 HERE
In such circumstances, individual regions adjust to the negative economic
environment with a varying degree of success. Employment losses are recorded
everywhere save for Kriti, Ipiros and Eastern Makedonia-Thraki, where figures remain
more or less the same (slightly positive or negative). Similarly, regional capital stock
levels decline in the majority of regions (Attiki, Ionian Islands and Kriti are the
exceptions). But the picture is more complicated for value-added. Several regions
exhibit significant output growth rates (Ipiros, Kriti, Eastern Makedonia-Thraki, Attiki
and Central Makedonia) given the general negative climate, while in the remaining
regions  the economic crisis also takes the form of output decline. The severest loses
are recorded in peripheral regions of the country, such as the Ionian (12.3%) and
Southern Aegean Islands (8.9%) and Western Makedonia (7.7%). However, it can be9
argued that these sharp negative trends are partly the outcome of the small size of their
manufacturing bases. In any event, Kriti appears the real winner in terms of both
(modest) employment and capital expansion coupled with substantial output growth.
Other regions, which also experience output growth, perhaps should be included in the
same category, despite their employment and capital stock losses. In contrast, output
decline in the other eight regions, it is fair to say, reflects the general collapse of their
manufacturing base.
From this information it is not difficult to speculate about the trends in labour and
capital productivity. Nationally, the modest increase in the value-added and the
parallel decline of capital stock, employment and labour cost have led to substantial
productivity gains, as made explicit in table 3. Capital productivity accelerates by
2.5% annually, while labour productivity (value-added per employee) increases
remarkably fast at 3.4% per year. The labour productivity gains are less dramatic, but
still substantial (1.15%), when the focus is on the growth of output per unit of labour
cost. This variation in labour productivity rates is the outcome of the divergence in the
trend lines of decline of employment and labour costs (the latter decreasing less
dramatically than the former). It can be argued that this divergence is indicative of an
improvement in the quality of human capital. Since labour costs decline much more
slowly than employment, it is logical to assume that those workers taking up positions
in new firms, or retaining their jobs, were actually more highly paid than those that
lost them. Given that higher wages usually reflect better educated or skilled and, thus,
more productive labour force, it is sound to conclude that skilled employees retained
their jobs while the less well trained exited the sector
1. Thus, variation in the growth
rates that the two labour productivity indicators measure can be associated, partly at
least, with improvement in the quality of human capital.
TABLE 3 HERE
As can be seen from table 3, only in Western Makedonia and the Southern Aegean
Islands does the growth of output per employee exceed the growth of output per unit
of labour cost. In all other regions, labour productivity gains are much lower, or even
negative, once labour costs are taken into account. Thus, the relative inputs of skilled
and specialised labour increase almost everywhere. It is also important to note that the
pace of quality improvement in human capital does vary between regions. There is
substantial spatial variation in the difference in the annual growth rates between the
two measures of labour productivity. The actual difference between the annual growth
of output per employee and output per unit of labour cost ranges from 2.57% (Attiki)
to –2.73% (Southern Aegean Islands). According to this measure the pace of human
capital quality improvement is faster in Attiki than elsewhere.
The leading role of the main metropolitan area is challenged when the focus turns to
productivity growth. Capital productivity increases faster in the peripheral regions of
the country (Northern Aegean Islands, Ipiros, Western Makedonia and Eastern
Makedonia-Thraki). The more industrialised areas follow (Western Greece, Central
Greece, Peloponissos and Central Makedonia). But, in contrast, in Attiki capital
productivity is almost stagnant (only a 0.48% annual increase). Finally, severe capital
productivity decline is recorded in two somewhat marginal regions (Ionian Islands and
Southern Aegean Islands).10
However, for labour productivity the picture is quite different. Using the evolution of
output per unit of labour cost as an indicator to account for differences in the levels of
education and skills, it is apparent that the Southern Aegean Islands (3.2%) and
Western Greece (3.1%) experience the higher growth rates. In contrast, negative
trends are recorded in three peripheral areas (Ionian Islands, Eastern Makedonia-
Thraki and Kriti) and one relatively industrialised region (Thessalia). Nevertheless,
the most important finding is that the labour productivity growth in Attiki is much
faster than that of the majority of other regions. Only the two above-mentioned areas
show higher productivity dynamism. The situation is even more clearly depicted when
labour productivity is viewed as output per employee. With the exception of Western
Greece, the annual rate of labour productivity growth in Attiki far outpaces that of the
rest of the country.
The above analysis points up a rather interesting process of differential productivity
growth ongoing among Greek regions. At one extreme, the capital region (Attiki) is
outperformed in terms of capital productivity growth by almost everywhere else. At
the other, Attiki appears to be one of the most dynamic regions in terms of labour
productivity expansion. It is worth recalling that this is the region that houses the
lion’s share of Greek manufacturing activity. Next it is important to ask whether this
dual process of uneven spatial productivity growth is accompanied by parallel
convergence trends.
Examination of the evolution of regional inequalities in the levels of capital
productivity (table 4) reveals that the regions showing higher growth rates are indeed
those that were lagging at the beginning of the period. Therefore, the dramatic
expansion of the output per unit of capital cost in regions such as the Northern Aegean
Islands, Western Makedonia, Central Greece or Ipiros has much to do with the fact
that in 1984 their capital productivity levels were less than the 70% of the national
average. Similarly, the trends are strongly negative, or near zero, in those regions
which, in 1984, were characterised by extremely high capital productivity levels (the
Southern Aegean and Ionian Islands had more than double the national average). By
1994 the disparities in capital productivity levels are much reduced. The main
metropolitan area appears still to be one of the most capital productive Greek regions.
However, the gap between Attiki and the other regions has narrowed. In contrast,
capital productivity in the two extreme cases of the Ionian and Southern Aegean
Islands has been severely reduced.
TABLE 4 HERE
Similarly, spatially differential labour productivity growth also appears to be
associated with a convergence process. Reviewing the figures in table 5 reveals that in
1984 labour productivity (value-added per unit of labour input cost) in Attiki was less
than 85% of the national average. The high labour productivity growth between 1984
and 1994 improved this figure to 92.8%. The regions, in contrast, which were initially
characterised by high labour productivity levels (Ionian Islands, Thessalia, Kriti,
amongst others) experienced negative or stagnant growth rates. The outcome of these
opposite trends is reduced regional disparity in labour productivity levels by 1994.11
TABLE 5 HERE
These findings suggest that there is a strong relationship between differential capital
and labour productivity growth and convergence. Regions that were lagging initially
in terms of capital productivity demonstrate higher growth rates, while similar trends
prevail in regions that in 1984 were well behind in terms of labour productivity
growth. In contrast, productivity declines or increases only at a slow pace in those
regions that in 1984 enjoyed the highest levels. It has to be understood, however, that
the convergence process does not automatically mean that all the lagging regions
catch up or that all the advanced regions are subject to decline. The most lagging
regions do not necessarily show the highest growth rates (Western Makedonia or
Central Greece in terms of capital productivity), in the same way that advanced
regions do not necessarily demonstrate negative trends (see Central Makedonia and
Western Greece in terms of capital and labour productivity respectively).
But the capital and labour productivity convergence process is still an undeniable fact
(table 6). Given the enormous variation in the size of the regional manufacturing
bases, the figures should be treated with some care. Some sharp changes in marginal
cases like those of the Ionian or Northern Aegean Islands, with limited manufacturing
bases, can significantly affect the coefficient of variation (CV). Even so, it is clear that
the convergence process is more intense in terms of capital than labour productivity.
This finding is, perhaps, indicative of the existence of significant spatial
differentiation in the methods of production and the employed technology. The quite
substantial differences in regional capital productivity (mainly a result of the
supremacy of Attiki) are substantially reduced over the decade (CV decreasing from
0.54 to 0.32). However, the regional disparities in capital productivity are still sharper
in 1994 when compared to the spatial inequalities in labour productivity.
TABLE 6 HERE
Labour productivity convergence is much more complicated. The initially rather
modest differences in labour productivity (value-added per unit of labour cost) decline
further. However, divergent trends prevail when labour productivity is taken as value-
added per employee. Here the CV increases from 0.20 to 0.24 between 1984 and
1994. This increase is not particularly high, but it does demonstrate that convergence
is not a ubiquitous phenomenon covering every aspect of regional economic
performance
2. The regional variation in the pace of improvement in the quality of
manufacturing human capital has already been pointed out. It can be argued that this
is, to a large extent, responsible for the divergent trends in the evolution of output per
employee.
The speed at which regional convergence takes place over the period is quite different
for capital and labour productivity (table 7). The annual rate of capital is 5.16%, while
that for labour productivity (cost based) convergence is much slower (2.93%). For
output per employee, divergence increases by 2.11% annually on average.
Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that both labour and capital productivity
convergence seem to be fairly constant over time. Although there is significant
variation in the figures for the annual rates of convergence, it is also true that the
trends are fairly constant (CV declines over time). In any respect, large yearly12
variations in productivity statistics are certainly not unexpected under conditions of
widespread de-industrialisation since firms do not tend to lay off all their redundant
personnel or dispose of all surplus capital stock at once.
TABLE 7 HERE
However, despite the persistence of the trends, the limitations of the convergence
process are also apparent. Projecting the current annual rates into the future, it will
take approximately 14 and 24 years, respectively, for regional inequalities in capital
and labour productivity levels to be cut by half. Anyway, as it will be demonstrated
subsequently, the continuation of these trends is a rather unlikely event.
5. Towards an explanation of the convergence trends
In the regional productivity literature, structural change and the diffusion of
technology have been outlined as the two most prominent sources of spatial
convergence. Diminishing returns are also a favourite candidate, especially among
those economists who find the neoclassical assumption of constant returns to scale
highly plausible. In this context, low annual rates of convergence can be attributed to
the fact that returns to scale in reproducible factors are almost constant (De la Fuente,
1997).
The productivity convergence trends reported in this paper are simply too high to be
attributed solely to the effects of diminishing returns to scale. They are a plausible
explanation for annual convergence rates of around 2%, but not higher. Furthermore,
and unhelpfully, the available data do not permit the testing of the structural change
hypothesis in the Greek context. Disagreggated data at manufacturing branch level are
needed for this task. However, it can be said with some assurance that technological
diffusion is not the main source of manufacturing productivity convergence among
Greek regions. A rather intuitive justification of this statement is provided by the fact
that the capital stock declined during the period almost everywhere. If technological
diffusion did, in fact, take place then it should have been accompanied by capital
stock expansion or, at least, increased investment levels (O’ Mahony, 1994).
However, this is certainly not the case and, thus, it is difficult to attribute regional
convergence in capital and labour productivity to the diffusion of technology. A more
elaborate explanation of the argument can be advanced once the evolution of regional
differences in capital to labour ratios (capital stock divided by labour cost) is
examined.
From the data of table 8 it is apparent that capital to labour ratios fell in almost all
Greek regions (save for Attiki, the Ionian and Southern Aegean Islands). Such a
decrease in capital intensity it is not a sign of technological diffusion which
presupposes rather the opposite. Moreover, it is interesting that capital to labour ratios
are much higher in the peripheral regions compared to Attiki. This is an even more
surprising finding, since the metropolitan area might be expected to have the highest
levels of capital intensity. Instead, it is the latter where capital intensity increases (at a
modest rate of 1.6% annually) to match the levels of the other regions (capital
intensity decreases nationally by 1.3% yearly) (table 3). The outcome of this tend is a
modest convergence in regional capital to labour ratios (tables 6 and 7)
3.13
TABLE 8 HERE
Thus, given the ubiquitous manufacturing decline that has taken place (mainly in
terms of employment and capital stock, but in eight regions also in terms of output) it
makes more sense to assume that spatial convergence in productivity levels is the
outcome of an adjustment process. The regions which have a manufacturing base
characterised by higher capital intensity experienced a sharper capital stock decline,
while in the more labour intensive regions de-industrialisation took the form of
employment decrease. The joint outcome of these twin processes was the convergence
in both capital and labour productivity levels.
A good question to be asked is under what circumstances the peripheral regions of
Greece appeared to be more capital-intensive than the core region. The examination of
the regional incentives legislation provides a plausible explanation.
In order to promote a more even spatial distribution of industrial activity the Greek
State has developed, since early seventies, a system of direct subsidies and other
incentives for investment undertaken in the periphery. Of course, regional incentives
were in operation much earlier, but after 1972 their significance increased
considerably. In addition, special efforts were made to spatially differentiate them,
because up until 1971 manufacturing investment implemented anywhere outside the
Attiki region enjoyed the same level of preferential treatment (Labrianidis and
Papamichos, 1990). Thus, from 1972 onwards the country was divided into zones
where substantially different subsidy rates and other incentives applied. In this system
firms locating in the peripheral regions received more aid than their counterparts in
the more industrialised regions of Greece (such as Central Greece or some counties of
Thessaly). In all cases, firms located in Attiki were excluded from direct subsidies,
while in some instances even self-funded investments were prohibited. The necessary
investment implementation permits (extension, environmental etc.) were not granted
on the grounds of the heavy congestion and pollution problems in the metropolitan
area.
One of the most important characteristics of the regional incentives system is capital
investment subsidy reaching, in some cases, as much as 50%. Thus, it makes sense to
assume that firms not only in the peripheral regions but also in the more industrialised
regions of the country certainly had a direct incentive to employ more capital-
intensive methods compared to their counterparts in Attiki. It was obviously cheaper
for firms to substitute labour with capital.
In the Greek literature the operation of the regional incentive legislation has been
subject to many criticisms on the grounds of its inefficiency in promoting regional
development. A detailed summary of these criticisms is given by Labrianidis and
Papamichos (1990: 465) who also mention: “Until 1981 the legislation promoted the
substitution of labour with capital, because it subsidised the cost of capital, and this
had very important repercussions on employment. In particular, the promotion of
capital intensive methods resulted …………… in the underuse of the comparative
advantages offered by the existence of an abundant labour force, in pressures for
wages increases, and in the unnecessary leakage of foreign exchange abroad to14
acquire expensive machinery, which in the end was underused. That is, there was a
gross discord between the legislation and the demands and abilities of the society.”
From the above concise account it is not difficult to explain the higher capital-
intensity of the manufacturing firms located outside Attiki. Although, this finding
appears at a first glance as surprising, it really is no surprise at all. The heavy direct or
indirect (through tax allowances etc.) subsidisation of capital investment, in both the
peripheral and some of the more industrialised areas, is to a large extent responsible.
Of course, there is always the possible counter-argument that the regional incentive
laws might have not had a great impact on the manufacturing base of the Greek
regions. (Not all the firms receive subsidies, while many of the firms that succeed in
their bids for state support do not finally implement the investments). Although, this
argument may have some validity in the context of the regional manufacturing
generally, it does not hold in this particular case. The data utilised in this paper refer
to firms employing more than twenty people, in other words, to large scale Greek
manufacturing. There is no doubt that these are exactly the firms that do bid for, and
actually receive, state subsidy, while it is also almost certainly the case that most of
their capital investment has received some sort of state support. (The share of the
investment that is undertaken by firms of this group independently of regional or other
incentives is rather small.) In addition, given the limited number of large-scale
manufacturing firms in Greek peripheral regions it is logical to expect that the impact
of the incentives legislation will be even higher in such locations. It is often enough
only for three or four firms to implement large state subsidised investments for the
manufacturing base of a peripheral region to be transformed completely.
Consequently, it is not difficult to imagine the impact of the regional incentive
legislation in the evolution of regional variation in capital intensity, capital and labour
productivity in Greece. The peripheral and more industrialised regions have become
more capital-intensive than the core, which has been excluded from the incentives.
Moreover, higher rates of capital-intensity in the periphery entailed lower capital
productivity than in the core, because machinery and equipment were under-utilised.
By the same token, labour productivity appears higher in these regions, since the
workers had more capital at their disposal.
It does not need a long discussion to point out that this situation could not be viable in
the long run. The variation in regional productivity levels was due to non-economic
factors and was not the outcome of disparities in the rate of technical progress.
Similarly, it is not difficult to imagine the impact of the higher capital intensity on
Greek peripheral regions under conditions of general industrial decline. The exodus of
proportionally more capital has become the major characteristic of de-industrialisation
in these regions, since this is the factor of production that was present in abundance.
In contrast, in Attiki the crisis took mainly the form of employment decline, due to the
fact that its manufacturing base was more labour-intensive
4. As an outcome, the core
region experienced a relatively higher labour productivity growth, while capital
productivity grew faster in the remaining regions of the country.
Thus, the convergence in capital and labour productivity levels has to be understood
as the outcome of an adjustment to the crisis, rather than an effect of greater
technological diffusion. However, it has to be stated that it is equally interesting to ask15
whether the crisis entailed, also, regional structural change. It has been mentioned
already that the available data do not allow such an analysis to be undertaken.
Nevertheless, one feature seems certain. Even if structural change plays an important
role in the convergence process, the results of the analysis here continue to hold. The
two sources of convergence (adjustment and structural change) are not mutually
exclusive.
6. Conclusions
From the previous analysis it has become clear that a process of capital and labour
manufacturing productivity convergence is under way in Greek regions between 1984
and 1994. The character of this process is rather peculiar since it is the core
metropolitan region of the country that moves to match the labour productivity levels
of the peripheral regions while the latter move towards the capital productivity levels
of the core. A closer look at the capital to labour ratios revealed a rather unexpected
situation with the peripheral regions exhibiting higher capital-intensity than the core
metropolitan area. However, this certainly unexpected element of regional variation it
is not surprising at all if closer attention is paid to the regional incentives legislation.
The acquisition of capital by the firms choosing to locate outside the main
metropolitan area has been heavily subsidised. It is easy enough to point out that this
heavy underwriting of capital expenditure has not only led to fewer jobs, as suggested
so far, but also to the acquisition of amounts of capital more than was really
necessary.
Thus, the productivity convergence process during mid-eighties to mid-nineties is not
really a mystery at all. Under conditions of heavy national de-industrialisation, the
main characteristic was the exodus of relatively greater numbers of workers from
Athens and the relatively higher decline in capital stock in other regions of the
country. Given that regional incentive laws had already subsidised the purchase of
capital in the periphery the firms that were closing down, or were downscaling, were
more capital intensive than their counterparts in Attiki. The latter, having been
excluded from the regional incentives, were more labour intensive and thus the
industrial decline there took the form of employment decline. The final outcome of
these two distinct processes was a twin convergence in both capital and labour
productivity levels.
Another interesting aspect of the convergence process was that the increase in labour
productivity was accompanied by an increase in the quality of the human capital.
Output per employee, labour productivity growth rates have been high and, in fact,
have contributed to divergence rather than convergence. (By 1994 Attiki had outpaced
the national productivity level). However, the growth rate of labour productivity,
defined as output per unit of labour cost, was much more moderate revealing that the
employees that kept their jobs were more highly paid and thus, in all likelihood, more
qualified or skilled.
The results of the present paper deserve to be studied further. An important question
to pose is what percentage of the productivity convergence can be attributed to
structural change? Unfortunately this question cannot be answered due to the lack of16
detailed data at the individual industry level. Nevertheless, the current results are still
helpful in terms of both analysis and policy.
From an analytical perspective what they point out is that the productivity
convergence process cannot be considered as viable in the long run since it is based
upon mere adjustment and not real technological diffusion. Moreover, it is doubtful if
the convergence process will have any impact on the elimination of uneven regional
industrial growth. Certainly in 1994 (the last year of available data) the regional
distribution of the main manufacturing indicators (value-added, employment, and
capital stock) was not more even than in 1984. In the same way that the relatively high
labour productivity levels of the peripheral regions in the past did not lead to a
reduction of the regional inequalities in the distribution of manufacturing output and
employment, it is unlikely that the improved capital productivity levels will achieve
that.
From a policy perspective it is interesting that the attempt, over a long period, to
facilitate the flow of capital towards the peripheral regions has not been successful. In
the absence of long-term data it is impossible to get a handle on the initial success of
the policy. However, even if the policy had a huge initial success, one conclusion
seems certain. Policies focusing solely on the increase in the availability of a single
factor of production are not successful in the long run. In the absence of provisions for
the facilitation of technical progress, the degree of success is subject to the law of
diminishing returns. After a certain point increases in the capital stock do not have a
large impact on either productivity or growth. Thus, regional policy should be turned
towards to the direction of promoting technical progress. This aim is not served by
simply subsidising the acquisition of newer and, thus, more advanced capital. The full
potential of technological advances can be realised only when they are broadly applied
(Krugman, 1994b). Thus, policy has to make sure that the fruits of new technology are
diffused across the whole regional productive spectrum.
                                                
1 It can be suggested that the slower decline of labour costs in relation to employment may be the
outcome of increases in labour unit costs or an expansion in the hours worked per person. Under
conditions of generalised de-industrialisation and growing unemployment it is difficult to account for
rises in unit labour costs, while the lack of data on hours worked does not allow the empirical
examination of the second hypothesis. However, as the overall level of employment has been reduced
by more than one quarter, an increase in the hours worked per person would appear unlikely, at least as
a major force. The inflexibility of the Greek large scale manufacturing labour market (part-time work is
rare) and the fact that data refer to average annual employment eliminate further the possibility that
differences in labour productivity growth rates are due to an expansion in hours worked.
2 In earlier work similar results have been reported to hold at a county level for a much longer period
(Melachroinos and Spence, 1997b). By using a different measure, that of manufacturing GDP per
employee, it was demonstrated that spatial inequalities in labour productivity levels actually deepened
during the period 1970-1988. Although these findings refer to a separate period, a different spatial
division and derive from different datasets (total manufacturing instead of firms employing more than
20 persons), nonetheless they are reassuringly similar to the present results.
3 The convergence trend would have been much higher than the almost negligible 0.2% annually (table
7) if the marginal case of the Ionian Islands had been excluded from the calculations.
4 This is far from an unexpected outcome. Varaiya and Wiseman (1981) have shown for US regions that
industrial crisis is more likely to take the form of intense employment decline in the traditional17
                                                                                                                                           
industrial areas than elsewhere. This happens because capital stock is usually older there and thus
production techniques are likely to be more labour intensive.18
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Table 1 Regional economic performance in manufacturing: evolution of value-added,
capital stock, employment and labour cost in Greece, 1984-1994. Figures are in

















Attiki 91,474 104,254 129,203 140,303 137,521 99,513
Eastern Makedonia-Thraki 8,968 10,642 21,275 17,911 15,136 14,648
Central Makedonia 45,686 49,332 78,057 65,646 60,273 49,703
Western Makedonia 2,433 1,094 12,341 3,702 3,252 1,631
Thessalia 15,616 12,653 35,673 25,115 19,002 13,723
Ipiros 1,764 2,636 5,480 4,979 2,919 3,013
Ionian Islands 513 137 527 818 474 194
Western Greece 12,234 11,024 32,685 20,949 16,909 8,699
Central Greece 33,165 29,784 133,033 87,537 32,057 23,093
Peloponissos 9,322 9,316 26,345 19,604 10,142 6,971
Northern Aegean Islands 598 360 2,638 848 986 506
Southern Aegean Islands 1,754 693 1,656 1,311 2,535 956
Kriti 1,696 2,207 3,912 4,086 2,278 2,367
Total Greece 225,223 234,132 482,826 392,808 303,484 225,017
Sources: ESYE (National Statistical Service of Greece): Annual Industrial Surveys
(1984-1991), and unpublished data (1992-1994). Melachroinos and Spence (1997a):
Capital stock estimations.
Table 2 Regional performance of manufacturing: annual rate of growth (percent) of









Attiki 1.32 0.83 -3.18 -0.75
Eastern Makedonia-Thraki 1.73 -1.71 -0.33 1.86
Central Makedonia 0.77 -1.72 -1.91 0.26
Western Makedonia -7.68 -11.34 -6.67 -8.20
Thessalia -2.08 -3.45 -3.20 -0.74
Ipiros 4.10 -0.95 0.32 2.59
Ionian Islands -12.33 4.49 -8.55 -7.25
Western Greece -1.04 -4.35 -6.43 -3.98
Central Greece -1.07 -4.10 -3.23 -1.30
Peloponissos -0.01 -2.91 -3.68 -0.61
Northern Aegean Islands -4.96 -10.73 -6.45 -5.56
Southern Aegean Islands -8.86 -2.31 -9.29 -11.69
Kriti 2.67 0.44 0.38 2.72
Total Greece 0.39 -2.04 -2.95 -0.75
Sources: Table 1. ESYE (National Statistical Service of Greece): Unpublished labour
cost data (1984-1994).21
Table 3 Regional productivity dynamics: annual rate of growth (percent) of labour
productivity (a) (value-added per employee), labour productivity (b) (value-added per
unit of labour cost), capital productivity (value-added per unit of capital cost) and












Attiki 4.65 2.08 0.48 1.59
Eastern Makedonia-Thraki 2.06 -0.13 3.49 -3.50
Central Makedonia 2.73 0.51 2.53 -1.97
Western Makedonia -1.08 0.57 4.13 -3.43
Thessalia 1.16 -1.35 1.42 -2.73
Ipiros 3.77 1.48 5.10 -3.45
Ionian Islands -4.14 -5.47 -16.10 12.66
Western Greece 5.76 3.07 3.47 -0.38
Central Greece 2.23 0.23 3.16 -2.84
Peloponissos 3.81 0.61 2.99 -2.31
Northern Aegean Islands 1.60 0.64 6.46 -5.47
Southern Aegean Islands 0.47 3.20 -6.71 10.62
Kriti 2.27 -0.05 2.22 -2.22
Total Greece 3.44 1.15 2.48 -1.30
Sources: As for tables 1 and 2.
Table 4 Regional inequalities in capital productivity of manufacturing: value-added
divided by capital stock in Greece, 1984-1994.
Prefectures/Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Attiki 151.8 146.8 139.7 130.2 129.0 129.2 126.0 127.5 122.7 124.7 124.7
Eastern Makedonia-
Thraki
90.4 91.9 94.5 103.4 99.6 97.2 105.9 99.6 111.4 113.8 99.7
Central Makedonia 125.5 128.0 129.9 139.2 128.9 123.7 126.7 126.5 135.9 130.5 126.1
Western Makedonia 42.3 41.5 41.8 36.6 39.9 43.8 43.8 33.3 30.8 36.9 49.6
Thessalia 93.8 90.8 96.7 94.2 99.5 105.7 102.4 103.2 92.5 92.3 84.5
Ipiros 69.0 84.4 91.1 108.5 88.3 90.4 99.3 101.2 91.7 84.7 88.1
Ionian Islands 208.5 236.0 210.9 218.5 121.4 109.3 90.4 114.5 78.5 68.5 28.2
Western Greece 80.2 72.0 81.8 85.4 77.7 76.8 78.8 80.0 81.2 84.0 88.3
Central Greece 53.4 51.8 50.5 49.5 59.4 57.8 57.6 54.8 54.2 51.0 57.1
Peloponissos 75.9 94.5 83.7 87.4 73.6 82.9 88.3 93.1 88.8 91.5 79.7
Northern Aegean Islands 48.6 54.0 72.8 61.5 55.4 41.0 59.0 47.0 76.5 60.9 71.1
Southern Aegean Islands 227.0 196.1 185.5 172.3 178.4 180.4 162.7 162.6 100.3 85.8 88.8
Kriti 93.0 117.3 102.8 111.0 119.8 120.5 103.8 94.3 101.0 100.8 90.6
Total Greece 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: As for table 1.22
Table 5 Regional inequalities in labour productivity of manufacturing: value-added
divided by labour cost in Greece, 1984-1994.
Prefectures/Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Attiki 84.7 86.0 88.3 87.4 88.9 90.3 88. 8 90.0 89.1 91.5 92.8
Eastern Makedonia-
Thraki
101.2 97.8 97.8 96.7 92.7 88.8 95.4 86.1 94.6 94.2 89.0
Central Makedonia 115.0 115.4 111.9 116.0 108.5 106.2 105.6 107.9 112.8 111.2 107.9
Western Makedonia 78.9 77.0 72.3 61.9 62.9 64.5 59.0 46.0 52.4 62.7 74.4
Thessalia 125.2 120.8 122.1 118.0 123.3 125.4 122.7 118.1 106.6 100.2 97.5
Ipiros 97.7 116.7 115.0 127.8 101.2 101.3 108.0 105.2 103.1 105.0 100.9
Ionian Islands 160.9 210.6 228.6 201.5 147.0 132.7 110.7 141.8 102.6 110.8 81.7
Western Greece 106.4 97.9 107.2 111.8 103.0 102.3 105.2 111.4 119.1 131.6 128.4
Central Greece 117.3 110.3 106.9 101.5 118.1 115.4 115.4 110.3 107.8 98.4 107.0
Peloponissos 135.9 159.0 139.5 157.0 127.4 134.1 157.9 161.5 149.0 139.9 128.8
Northern Aegean Islands 89.8 87.2 107.1 88.7 79.3 50.6 98.8 78.2 131.1 89.6 85.4
Southern Aegean Islands 79.6 66.9 62.2 57.4 65.2 64.5 58.5 59. 4 35.0 96.4 97.3
Kriti 119.0 137.8 120.8 113.1 125.8 127.5 111.1 111.6 120.2 110.4 105.5
Total Greece 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: As for tables 1 and 2.
Table 6 Coefficient of variation (CV) of capital productivity, labour productivity (a)
(value-added per employee) and (b) (value-added per labour cost) and capital to
labour ratios of manufacturing based on regions in Greece, 1984-1994.
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994








0.21 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.29 0.18 0.16
Capital to labour ratio
(capital stock divided per
labour cost)
0.41 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.28 0.40
Sources: As for tables 1,2, 4 and 5.
Table 7 Annual average rate of convergence (percent per annum) of capital
productivity, labour productivity (a) (value-added per employee) and (b) (value-added
































52.93 5.23 -2.82 -28.90 12.56 -9.11 21.90 -2.10 -37.31 -12.76 -2.93
Capital to labour ratio
(capital stock divided per
labour cost)
-5.15 -4.67 4.93 -8.78 -2.36 5.89 -0.87 1.04 -23.71 43.54 -0.19
Source: Table 6.23
Table 8 Regional inequalities in capital intensity of manufacturing: capital stock
divided by the labour cost in Greece, 1984-1994.
Prefectures/Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Attiki 55.8 58.6 63.2 67.2 68.9 69.9 70.4 70.6 72.6 73.4 74.4
Eastern Makedonia-
Thraki
111.1 106.3 103.4 93.6 93.1 91.4 90.0 86.4 84.9 82.8 89.4
Central Makedonia 91.6 90.2 86.2 83.3 84.2 85.9 83.3 85.3 83.0 85.3 85.6
Western Makedonia 186.6 185.8 173.0 169.0 157.8 147.4 134.8 138.4 170.1 169.8 150.1
Thessalia 133.4 133.0 126.3 125.3 123.9 118.7 119.8 114.4 115.2 108.5 115.3
Ipiros 141.6 138.2 126.2 117.8 114.6 112.1 108.8 104.0 112.4 123.9 113.6
Ionian Islands 77.2 89.2 108.4 92.2 121.1 121.4 122.6 123.9 130.7 161.9 289.7
Western Greece 132.6 135.9 131.1 131.0 132.5 133.1 133.4 139.2 146.7 156.8 145.5
Central Greece 219.5 212.8 211.7 205.0 198.9 199.7 200.2 201.2 198.8 193.1 187.5
Peloponissos 179.2 168.3 166.6 179.6 173.2 161.7 178.9 173.4 167.8 152.9 161.5
Northern Aegean Islands 184.9 161.6 147.2 144.2 143.1 123.4 167.6 166.5 171.3 147.3 120.0
Southern Aegean Islands 35.1 34.1 33.5 33.3 36.5 35.7 36.0 36.6 34.9 112.3 109.6
Kriti 128.0 117.4 117.5 101.9 104.9 105.8 107.0 118.3 119.0 109.5 116.5
Total Greece 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: As for tables 1 and 2.